Investors, customers, and other stakeholders rely on the information disclosure by firms to evaluate numerous dimensions of the firm's operations and potential for future profitability. As environmental performance has become increasingly important to customers and investors, intermediaries have developed to fill the void left by the lack of standardized or required reporting and help alleviate the information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders. The ability of these intermediaries to provide accurate and useful information depends on the strategic disclosure of information and reporting by firms. In this paper, we examine one of the largest and most influential intermediaries, the Carbon Disclosure Project, to examine how the contents and the linguistic characteristics of the firm's survey response determines the CDP scoring, and whether the CDP scores are informative to predict subsequent environmental performance.
Introduction
Investors and other external stakeholders rely on the release of information by firms to assess the potential and performance of that firm. Because firm reports can influence stakeholder actions from share price to capital availability to activist protest, firms have the incentive to strategically manage their reporting. This is true for standardized reporting, such as annual reports, and likely even more relevant for less standardized reporting with fewer opportunities for validation of reported information, such as voluntary disclosure of firm activities related to environmental performance. Especially as climate change becomes an increasingly important factor shaping the regulatory and competitive environment of firms, third party intermediaries that summarize and evaluate information about how firms are positioned to meet the diverse opportunities and challenges of climate change is increasingly valuable. Yet, we have little evidence regarding the construction or validity of intermediary evaluations. This paper argues that both the content and the linguistic characteristics of voluntary disclosure are informative, and evaluates the informational value of the Carbon Disclosure Project scoring metrics.
The importance of corporate social/environmental performance has gained growing interest as social/environmental issues become increasingly relevant to firm operations and performance. Questions examined in the literature include under what circumstances firms respond to stakeholder pressures and go beyond government mandate (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; King, 2008; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Maxwell, Lyon, Hackett, 2000) , whether corporate initiatives and disclosures are truthful and meaningful (Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013; King and Lenox, 2000; Kim and Lyon, 2015) , and how corporate social/environmental performance relates to financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003 ). An increasing number of studies in this research stream, especially more recent ones, are empirical studies that measure corporate social/environmental performance using quantitative scores published by information intermediaries Flammer, 2013) . However, we have a significant lack of understanding of how social/environmental information intermediaries transform corporate reports and voluntary disclosures to quantifiable scores in the absence of government-backed standardized measures and processes, and how their scores in turn relate to real corporate actions. We address this issue. We argue that both the content and the linguistic characteristics of voluntary disclosures matter.
An increasing number of firms choose to publicly disclose their environmental initiatives and performance. When firms opt for voluntary provision of information, the information provided tends to include favorable information about the firm (Verrecchia, 1983) . Because firm reports can influence stakeholder actions from share price to capital availability to activist protest, firms have the incentive to strategically manage their reporting. This is true for standardized reporting, such as annual reports, and likely even more relevant for less standardized reporting with fewer opportunities for validation of reported information, such as voluntary disclosure of firm activities related to environmental performance. Given the incentives for firms to strategically manage what information to disclose and shape the language they use to describe their investments and activities, it is not obvious that the information voluntarily reported will be predictive of the firm's environmental performance. Under the circumstances, third-party intermediaries can provide assurance about the quality of firm disclosures and help summarize and interpret voluntary disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ).
Unlike brokerage firms, who have significant economic incentives to publicly endorse high growth stocks with higher levels of trading activity (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004) and analysts who tilt their attention and recommendations in favor of growth stocks (Jegadeesh, et al., 2004) , independent third party intermediaries providing information on environmental performance to stakeholders don't have the same incentives to distort information. We therefore expect that the scores generated by such an intermediary reflect the content of voluntary reports. Drawing on recent accounting literature that documents linguistic characteristics of firm reporting (Bushee, Gow, Taylor, 2015; Li, 2008) , including the "readability" of such reports, we also expect that the scores of the intermediary will be influenced by the linguistic attributes of firms voluntary reports.
However, even if the intermediary seeks to evaluate the reported content accurately, the information reported is only valuable to stakeholders if it is predictive of subsequent firm performance. With little opportunity for verification, firms may mis-report actions and initiatives, making the predictive power of the content of report low. The analysis of firms' reports by the intermediary may therefore either add information by summarizing and processing the content of the report, or may be little more than noise if it reflects misinformation or is biased by the firm's report.
In this paper, we evaluate both the information disclosure and the linguistic characteristics of the firm's voluntary reporting in response to annual surveys from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a group backed by 822 large institutional investors that collectively represent $95 trillion in assets. 1 The CDP survey seeks information on the firm's activities in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions and how the firm manages a multitude of opportunities and risks associated with climate change. The purpose is explicitly to provide the investors (and other stakeholders) with information about how climate change will impact the firm, and what the firm is doing about it. Based on detailed analysis of the 2015 CDP survey responses and CDP scores for over 1700 public firms, we find that the CDP's scores reflect the content and linguistic characteristics of the firm's response to the survey.
The linguistic measures alone explain 39% of the variance in the disclosure score. In fact, these measures are also highly predictive of the CDP's assessed sustainability performance score, underscoring the perceived importance of report readability.
However, the scores don't recognize the lack of transparency reflected by the Fog Index. 2 Based on an analysis of survey responses, scores, and reported greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the years 2009-2014, neither the initiatives reported by the firm nor the CDP's performance score is predictive of the firm's subsequent environmental performance. However, for the reports with greater transparency (lower Fog Index values), the CDP's scores do in fact prove informative about subsequent performance. This evidence suggests that the CDP adds values as an intermediary, the information value of the scores depends on the clarity of the survey responses, which may be strategically managed by the firm.
Our paper extends prior firm disclosure research by taking a first step in opening up the black box between voluntary disclosures by firms and ratings by environmental information intermediaries. Prior research has treated social/environmental ratings given by information intermediaries as something exogenous to firms. That is, firms disclose their social and environmental performance (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Ullmann, 1985) , information intermediaries then review and rate firms' performance (Chatterji, et al., 2015; Delmas, et al., 2013; Sharfman, 1996) , and then firms respond to ratings (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010) . However, our research shows that ratings given by information intermediaries may not necessarily be exogenous and firms can significantly influence how they are rated. We find that emissions reductions in the past does not have highly significant influence on ratings given by information intermediaries. Instead, what companies report and how companies report have a more significant influence on ratings given by information intermediaries. Our findings show that companies can significantly shape ratings by strategically managing what they report and how they report and thereby use voluntary disclosures as a strategic management tool.
Theory & Hypotheses
Corporate disclosures are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors and stakeholders. Firms provide information through mandatory requirements such as the financial statements. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication via press releases, corporate websites, and other corporate reports.
Demand for corporate disclosures arises from information asymmetry between managers and outsiders (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ).
Voluntary disclosure of information by management may not reduce information asymmetry because voluntarily provided information tends to include favorable information about the firm (Jung and Kwon, 1988; Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983) .
However, the propensity to selectively disclose favorable information can still foster a positive image for external stakeholders (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath, and Wood, 2011; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011) . And this in turn can help firms gain competitive advantages. For example, in the context of our paper, firms with the appearance of favorable CSR performance can gain easier access to capital (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008) , have higher share prices (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) , and avoid activist protests (Baron, 2001; Lyon and Maxwell, 2008) . Thus, firms have an incentive to shape the information they voluntarily disclose in a way that provides them with an advantage.
Under the circumstances, third party intermediaries can serve a role to collect and process information, potentially capturing economies of scale and serving as a valuable information sources for stakeholders, reducing information asymmetry. This is important because these information sources shape the allocation of capital and other resources (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Yet, studies of financial analysts and brokers demonstrate that these intermediaries may have conflicts of interest, such that the information they provide may be shaped in part by their incentives to generate revenue from underwriting services or from future trades (Jegadeesh, et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998) .
In our context, the relevant information intermediary is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). CDP was formed by a group of large investors for the purpose of requesting information on climate change impacts from publicly traded firms. The annual survey of firms began in 2003, and both the investor group and the set of reporting firms has grown dramatically over time. The purpose is explicitly to provide the investors (and other stakeholders) with information about how climate change will impact the firm, and what the firm is doing to mitigate negative impacts and take advantage of any opportunities. Thus, at first glance, it appears that CDP is free from conflicts of interest. Interestingly, however, although CDP is a not-forprofit organization, its diverse funding sources include corporate sponsorship. 3 Thus, CDP may not be entirely free from conflicts of interest.
Under the circumstances, we posit that in processing and translating the information provided by firms, CDP gives full consideration to corporate responses without any preconception. That is, although firms may engage in strategic reporting, for example, by cherry picking favorable initiatives and projects (Kim and Lyon, 2011) and CDP is aware of this possibility, CDP is likely to just straightforwardly process corporate responses to its questions without downplaying the information provided.
CDP asks a variety of questions, ranging from corporate governance and incentive systems to specific targets, projects and emissions reductions. Corporate governance mechanisms and incentive systems can indicate commitment to environmental sustainability (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2008) and quantitative disclosure such as specific targets, number of projects, and emissions reductions can give a more direct indication of corporate environmental engagement and support (Wiseman, 1982) . Reneging on public preannouncements can harm a firm's reputation (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha, 2007) , so disclosures against which external stakeholders can assess firm performance over time seem especially meaningful. Thus, we posit that CDP generally has a favorable view of corporate responses to CDP questions, and has a high regard for environmental initiatives that can be verified over time.
H1: CDP scores reflect content of the report, providing higher scores for firms that report initiatives to manage and improve environmental performance.
Processing corporate responses to CDP questions may also include looking into linguistic characteristics. Recent advances in text analysis software have opened a line of inquiry in the accounting literature, focusing on evaluating the linguistic characteristics of firm's reporting. Existing research has suggested that firms may strategically manage disclosure "readability" (Bushee, Gow, Taylor, 2015; Li, 2008) and uncovered specific patterns related to the readability of corporate reports. In particular, poorly performing firms tend to obfuscate the presentation of information, whereas well-performing firms make more straightforward disclosures (Li, 2008; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Newman and Sansing, 1992) . More complicated corporate reports increase the information processing cost for investors, and thus small investors invest more in firms that make more readable and more informative disclosures (Lawrence, 2013; Rennekamp, 2012) . This means that when corporate reports are less readable, financial analysts can better capture economies of scale in processing information and serve as a valuable information sources for stakeholders. Indeed, financial analysts are found to exert more efforts in analyzing firms with less readable disclosure and add greater value in lessening information asymmetry under such circumstances (Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, 2011) . This is especially relevant to our context, environmental reporting, where the problem of information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders is more pronounced than in financial reporting due to lack of standardized measures of required reports. Accordingly, we posit that as an information intermediary, CDP takes into account linguistic characteristics. Although CDP is predisposed to give due consideration to corporate responses without bias, it is not prone to falling for obfuscation by poorly performing firms. CDP is likely to negatively view obfuscation by firms. At the same time, to the extent that full disclosure helps to lessen information asymmetry about corporate environmental behavior (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011) , CDP is likely to positively regard more thorough reporting.
H2: CDP scores reflect linguistic characteristics of the report, in particular lower
scores for obfuscation and higher scores for more thorough reporting.
Overall, the evidence indicates that information intermediaries lessen the extent of information asymmetry between firms and external stakeholders and add value in the market (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). For example, financial analysts gather and process a variety of information about different stocks, form their beliefs about the stocks' intrinsic values relative to their current market prices, make forecasts about their earnings prospects, and rate the investment potential of each stock (Jegadeesh, et al., 2004) . Prior work has shown that analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate than time-series models of earnings (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Brown et al., 1987) . In addition, analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations affect subsequent stock prices (Francis and Soffer, 1997) . In other words, financial analysts can add value in the capital market by increasing the credibility of management disclosures and by uncovering new information by engaging in private information production (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ).
We expect the same for environmental information intermediaries such as CDP.
Although what firms disclose and how firms disclose can influence how CDP evaluates the information provided by firms in the absence of standardized measures, potential conflicts of interest do not seem more severe for CDP than for typical financial intermediaries. In addition, to the extent that CDP performs due diligence, for example by properly analyzing the content of corporate reports and exerting more efforts to interpreting reports with less readable disclosures, scores given by CDP should predict subsequent environmental performance. In one of the few existing studies evaluating the informational value of environmental intermediaries, Chatterji et al. (2009) find that the environmental "weaknesses" identified by the KLD are predictive of a number of different measures of subsequent firm environmental performance, although the "strengths" identified by KLD are not.
H3: CDP scores predict subsequent environmental performance.
The ability of the CDP to process the survey responses and generate meaningful summary scores may be limited by the readability of the response. When the responses are less transparent, either as a result of purposeful action of obfuscating respondents or because of an inadvertent lack of clarity, the CDP's performance score may not accurately reflect the environmental positioning of the firm, reducing the predictive power. In addition, it has been demonstrated that firms with less readable accounting disclosures have less persistent earnings in subsequent periods (Li, 2008) . The paper does not explore the mechanism so what drives this phenomenon is not clear. Yet, it has also been suggested that overall investors regard accounting information credible and this confidence may be driven at least partly by managers' potential legal liability for providing misleading disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Together, these studies point to the possibility of how uncertainty might play a role. Firms with greater uncertainty in the future may make less readable reports and disclosures to avoid liability.
For firms with greater uncertainty ahead of them, any metrics produced by information intermediaries that are based on firms' prior actions and performance and commitment to the future inherently suffer from less predictive power. We have hypothesized that CDP scores are based on the content of firms' reports which are basically about firms' past and commitment going forward. Thus, we expect the extent to which CDP scores predict subsequent environmental performance to be further moderated by readability.
H4: The extent to which CDP scores predict subsequent environmental performance is moderated by readability.

Empirical Methodology
Driven by the dearth of information on environmental performance of firms, large investors came together to support the development of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a non-profit information intermediary backed by 822 large institutional investors that collectively represent $95 trillion in assets as of 2016. The CDP survey seeks information on the firm's activities in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions and how the firm manages a multitude of opportunities and risks associated with climate change. Firms that are surveyed by the CDP are not required to respond, and can elect to respond but keep their response private. Over time, the pressure to both respond and to make the responses public has grown as the number of large public firms doing so has increased. Figure 1 depicts the number of public firms disclosing survey responses to the CDP each year. The CDP reports that the firms responding to the 2015 survey are from 51 countries and represent 55% of the market capitalization of listed companies globally (CDP 2015) . Additionally, the CDP produces an aggregate "score" for the firm based on degree to which it responds to the survey and also its environmental performance (CDP 2015) . We use these voluntary reports to study how the linguistic and quantifiable content is associated with subsequent firm performance. Our primary measures of report content, linguistic characteristics, and firm GHG emissions are all drawn from the publicly disclosed survey results.
Measures -Report Contents
The survey responses include detailed information on the governance, voluntary emissions targets, and actions of the firm with respect to climate change. With respect to the firm's governance model, the survey asks firms to report the highest level within the organization that has direct responsibility for climate change. The firm selects from standardized answers to include that responsibility is at the level of the board, a senior manager, lower level manager, or not assigned. We code indicator variables for the responsibility with the board (BoardResponsible) or the senior manager (SeniorResponsible), and group the very few responses of lower level management with the "no responsibility" responses as the excluded group. In addition, the survey asks whether the firm provides incentives for the management of climate change issues; we code this as an indicator variable HasIncentives equal to one for firms that respond in the affirmative.
In terms of GHG emissions targets, the survey asks firms whether they have an emissions reduction target in place. The responses are standardized to indicate that there is an intensity target (scaled target in terms of emissions per unit, typically per dollar of revenue or per employee), an absolute target (target in terms of the total quantity of emissions), both an intensity and an absolute target, or no target. We code indicator variables for the absolute, intensity, and both targets (Absolute, Intensity, and BothTarget, respectively), with the no target response as the excluded group.
Finally, the survey asks firms to report the total number of emissions-reducing projects in place or underway. We use the total count of reported projects underway as an indication of the amount of emissions-reducing activity by the firm as reported in that year, and code this as the count variable NumActions. 4 
Measures -CDP Scores
The CDP summarizes the survey responses of each firm with two "scores": a disclosure score, indicating the perceived completeness of the firm's response to the survey, and a performance score, indicating the performance of the company in terms of recognizing and responding to the risks and opportunities associated with climate change. The disclosure score is numeric, from zero to 100. The performance score is a letter grade from A to E, which we code from 5 to 0 (A is a 5).
Measures -Linguistic Characteristics
We use two statistics to measure the report readability. Both statistics are created based on the section of the survey response that forms the most substantial free text there is no response (which happens occasionally) we will also control for this with an indicator equal to one when the response is blank (ZeroWords).
The second measure we use to capture survey response readability, again based on the most substantial free text response, is the length of the response. Because the Information processing cost of longer documents is presumed to be higher, assuming everything else to be equal, longer documents seem to be more deterring and more difficult to read. On the other hand, longer responses may be more revealing and complete. We use the number or words and number of sentences to reflect the length of response. 6
Measures -GHG Emissions
The survey asks respondents to report the annual GHG emissions of the firm. Each firm is asked to report the Scope 1 (within the operational control of the firm) Scope 2 (from purchased electricity) and Scope 3 (up-or down-stream in the value chain)
emissions. We elect to use Scope 1 emissions in our analysis, because these 
Controls
In the analysis investigating the predictive value for subsequent emissions, we control for year and industry fixed effects. We also control for growth of the firm, as reflected by the number of employees (Emp). This data is drawn from Compustat North America and Compustat Global. We experimented with using sales revenue as an alternative control for firm growth, but found the number of employees to have more explanatory power in the regressions predicting emissions. Further, as the level of emissions is highly auto-correlated within firm, we control for the lagged level of scope 1 GHG emissions (Chatterji et al 2009) .
Summary Statistics
Our analysis will employ two different datasets. The first dataset, which we use to examine the determinants of the CDP scores, is based on the 2015 survey report data. These data are summarized in Table Table 2 . We will use these data to estimate pooled cross sectional regressions examining the extent to which CDP scores, report content and linguistic characteristics are predictive of subsequent firm GHG emissions levels.
Results
Determinants of the CDP scores
Our first analysis examines the determinants of the CDP scores in order to test hypothesis 1, that the CDP scores are higher for firms that report initiatives to improve environmental performance, and hypothesis 2, that CDP scores are lower for reports with greater linguistic obfuscation and higher for more thorough reporting. As noted above, we use the data from the 2015 survey to test our predictions. Results are presented in Table 3 , for the disclosure score, and Table 4, for the performance score.
For the analysis of the disclosure score, we use an OLS model because the dependent variable is a continuous integer. The first model in Table 3 includes the measures of the content of the report, reflecting the firms reported initiatives. All of the measures included significantly increase the disclosure score. A firm's score is increasing in the governance responsibility of the board and a senior manager (relative to lower managers or no assigned responsibility) by approximately the same amount. The score is also higher for firms that have incentives within the organization for improving environmental performance, and have committed to voluntary emissions reductions targets. Intensity targets and absolutely targets appear to be given about the same amount of credit, while having both types of targets in place receives a premium. The number of emissions-reducing actions reported by the firm also increases its disclose score. All of these relationship are as predicted, with the CDP score reflecting the firms reported actions.
The second model in Table 3 examines the degree to which the CDP disclosure score reflects the linguistic characteristics of the survey response. The results suggest that the disclosure score responds positively to the length of the survey response, but is not influenced by the degree of obfuscation in the language, providing a partial support for hypothesis two. Interestingly, firms that provide no response to the free text portion (where thye are asked to describe the opportunities and risks presented by climate change) receive substantially lower disclosure scores. When we combine all of the content and linguistic characteristics, as reported in model 3, the results are comparable. Table 4 provides the analogous estimations for the 2015 CDP performance score.
The performance score is categorical (A through E), so we use an ordered logit model for this analysis, assigning a performance score of A the highest value of 5.
Once again, the reported initiatives of the firm are positively reflected in the performance score (model 1). As above, reporting both an absolute and an intensity target is rewarded a higher score, and the firm's score increases if they offer incentives, have board or senior manager responsibility, and as they report more actions to reduce GHG emissions. The linguistic characteristics also show a similar pattern to above: the number of words is correlated with a higher performance score, but the fog index is not reflected in the performance score.
Given the similarity in results for the performance score and the disclosure score, and the high correlation between the performance and disclosure score (the pairwise correlation is 0.72), we also estimated a performance score model including the disclosure score, as reported in model (3) of Table 4 . The disclosure score is highly statistically significant and positive, and more than doubles the explanatory power of the model (relative to model 1), but interestingly the reported initiatives remain predictive of the performance score, suggesting that they have explanatory power above and beyond the disclosure score.
Before we turn to the second analysis, of the relationship between the scores and report attributes and subsequent firm GHG emissions levels, it is useful to examine As the results of model 1 in Table 5 We also investigated whether the initiatives reported by the firm in their survey responses predict subsequent environmental performance. The first model in Table   6 reports these results. The only initiative that appears to predict the subsequent emissions level is whether the firm has incentives for environmental performance in place. However, the sign is the opposite of what one might anticipate, since having incentives is associated with higher emissions levels.
Finally, we split the firms into subsamples based on the quartiles of average GHGintensity (scope 1 emissions per employee) for the industry. We re-estimated the regression for each sub-sample of firms. It is only for firms in the least GHG intensive industries (these include banking, financial firms, consultancies, insurance companies) that having emissions targets in place is associated with a decline in the level of GHG emissions. Other reported initiatives are never associated with emissions reductions.
Overall, this is evidence that, lacking verifiability of the voluntarily reported initiatives and the strategic reporting by firms makes it hard for intermediaries to provide an informative view of the environmental performance of firms. Reports and CDP scores are summaries of the firm's reported actions, which bear little on the subsequent environmental performance improvements of the firm. It is only for the most transparent firms that the CDP is able to provide guidance on the subsequent environmental performance of the firm based on the information reported in the survey.
Conclusion
As environmental performance becomes increasingly important to customers, investors, and other stakeholders, the lack of standardized reporting and verifiable information on firm investments and efforts to improve environmental performance Our analysis directly evaluated the informational value of the CDP scores and the contents of the reports by examining the degree to which the scores and information can predict subsequent changes in environmental performance. On average, the CDP performance score does not predict subsequent environmental performance, at least as measured by the Scope 1 GHG emissions of the firm.
However, we do find evidence that for the more transparent reports, those with higher readability scores (lower Fog Index), the CDP's performance score does predict subsequent performance. This is especially interesting because the contents of the report, the initiatives reported by the firm, do not predict subsequent performance, even for the more transparent reports. So, the CDP scores are adding information that is useful for stakeholders.
Further, this findings complements, and in some ways contradicts, the finding of Chatterji et al. (2009) that the "environmental strengths" indicated in the KLD ratings were not predictive of subsequent environmental performance. The CDP performance score is largely an indicator of firm "strengths" in the sense that it reflects the positive initiatives of the firm to reduce emissions and prepare for climate change-induced challenges. We find that these strengths, as reflected in the performance score, are predictive of subsequent performance, but only for the more "readable" reports.
While this study contributes to the nascent literature evaluating environmental information intermediaries, it is not without limitation. In particular, we examine only one metric of environmental performance, GHG emission. The benefit of doing so is that it is available and comparable across the numerous firms and industries in our sample. The detriment of this approach is that stakeholders certainly care about other measures of environmental performance, including toxic waste releases, penalties from non-compliance with environmental regulations, and natural resource destruction. In addition, this study does not yet address the determinants of the firm's level of readability in their survey responses. In ongoing work, we plan to examine this aspect of the phenomenon in order to better interpret the degree to which the Fog Index reflect intentional obfuscation, as is often assumed in the accounting literature, or a more benign lack of experience in reporting environmental initiatives. 3,750 *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level All regressions include industry and year level fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by firm, reported in parentheses. TAKE AWAY: Emissions highly correlated over time, high explanatory power of just looking at last year's emissions and the growth of the firm. On average the CDP performance score does not provide any additional information, BUT when condition with fog index, performance score predicts emissions reductions for the reporters that are less obfuscating in their report. (2)-(4) use subsamples split by quartile of the average GHG intensity (Scope 1 emissions per employee) for the industry. TAKE AWAY: On average, reported initiatives do not predict reductions in emissions for the firm. The reported actions that the scoring rewards -targets and senior responsibility -appear related to emissions reductions only for the least GHGintensive industries (this includes financial services, banks, etc).
